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Personal social networking sites (SNS) are popular outlets for people to share information 
about themselves, their family and friends, and their personal and professional lives.  On 
the surface, the information shared may seem to be innocuous or nonthreatening.  
However, prior studies have shown that cybercriminals can take information shared via 
personal SNS and use it to conduct attacks against organizations.  Organization 
executives are of particular interest to cybercriminals because they have access to 
sensitive data, and they also have the ability to command actions from their subordinates.  
The purpose of this study was to explore what executive personal SNS behaviors pose 
financial risks to an organization. 
 
This study utilized grounded theory method (GTM) to interview nine information 
security professionals to discover their perceptions regarding executives’ personal SNS 
behaviors that could pose a financial risk to an organization.  The researcher used a semi-
structured interview process in order to collect thick, rich data for analysis.  Respondents 
came from a diverse array of industries, thus providing data from multiple perspectives. 
 
The resulting data analysis revealed four overarching dimensions:  Loss of Intellectual 
Property or Sensitive Data; Compliance Violations; Harm to Reputation, and Fraudulent 
Transaction Loss.  These overarching dimensions were supported by multiple themes, 
which were built on concepts identified from respondent interview data.  These 
overarching dimensions were used to build an emergent theoretical model to explain what 
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 Cybercriminals direct social engineering attacks at organizational employees as a 
means to secure access to sensitive data (Conteh & Royer, 2016; Gardner & Thomas, 
2014; Greitzer et al., 2014; Wilcox, Bhattacharya, & Islam, 2014).  Adversaries collect 
and use intelligence to engage in organizational attacks through various vectors.  For 
example, cybercriminals use pretexting, a form of social engineering (SE), to create 
scenarios that convince victims to perform the desired action (Brody, Brizzee, & Cano, 
2012; Greitzer, et al., 2014; Luo, Brody, Seazzu, & Burd, 2011). Cybercriminals can 
employ pretexting in many attack vectors, including phishing (Conteh & Royer, 2016; 
Symantec, 2015; Verizon Enterprises, 2016), spear phishing (He, 2012; Heartfield & 
Loukas, 2015; Laszka, Lou, & Vorobeychik, 2015; Teplinsky, 2013), vishing via 
telephone, voice over IP (VoIP), or short message service (SMS) messages (Gardner & 
Thomas, 2014; Shahriar, Klintic, & Clincy, 2015). 
 Frequently, cybercriminals collect data used in these attacks through personal social 
media channels which belong to an employee, such as community-based platforms 
(Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn), discussion boards, blogs, and wikis (Greitzer, et al., 2014; 
He, 2012; Kim, 2012).  Collectively, these channels are called social network sites, or 
SNS (boyd & Ellison, 2007).  Data collected about an employee via SNS may seem 
harmless to an organization.  However, like Humphreys, Gill, and Krishnamurthy (2014, 
p. 846) noted, when aggregated, this type of data "…may tell a deeper, more intimate 
2 
 
story" about an individual. 
 Data gathered from SNS users can be used to design SE attacks (Constantiou & 
Kalinikos, 2015; Palmer, 2020; Social-Engineer LLC, 2019).  SNS users share personal 
information for various reasons, such as developing or maintaining personal relationships 
or general knowledge acquisition (Krasnova, Veltri, Eling, & Buxmann, 2017; Wakefield 
& Wakefield, 2016), as well as perceived benefits to job performance (Ali-Hassan, Nevo, 
& Wade, 2015).  Such data, collected from employees’ personal SNS, helps 
cybercriminals to design realistic pretexting scenarios (Greitzer, et al., 2014; He, 2012; 
Kim, 2012). 
 Once cybercriminals collect SNS data, they next look to use it for SE attacks against 
organizations (Greitzer, et al., 2014).  Email account compromise (EAC) is one such type 
of SE attack.  With an EAC attack, cybercriminals can use SNS data to hijack or 
impersonate executives’ accounts and use the authority of the executives’ position to 
direct employees to initiate an EFT or wire transfer to a bank account that they control 
(Burch, Taylor, & Yeung, 2015; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017; Kemp, 2016).  
Upon receipt of the funds, the cybercriminal then disperses the funds to other accounts, 
for obfuscation and making recovery of those funds for the victim organization difficult, 
if not impossible (Burch, et al., 2015; Meinert, 2016). 
 Organization executives are frequent targets of EACs because of their access to 
sensitive data, as well as their ability to command actions from subordinates (Bullée, 
Montoya, Pieters, Junger, & Hartel, 2017; Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2017; Sharp, 
2017; Trustwave, 2017).  Executives make these attacks easier for cybercriminals by 
sharing data on SNS (Burch, et al., 2015).  Such breaches put organizations at risk in 
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three primary areas:  monetary losses, corporate liability, and credibility (Cavusoglu, 
Cavusoglu, & Raghunathan, 2004).  Kemp (2016) noted a 270% increase in this type of 
attack since January 2015, with an estimated loss of 2.3 billion dollars in 2014-2015.  The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (2017) reported a 2,370% increase in identified losses 
between January 2015 and December 2016, with instances occurring in each of the 50 
states in the United States of America, as well as 131 countries.  As these numbers 
demonstrate, successful attacks can have a direct impact on the organization's financial 
well-being, ranging from inconvenient to catastrophic. 
 Categorizing the types of data being accessed by cybercriminals to engage in EAC 
attacks has proven to be difficult, due to the lack of a seminal definition.  For example, 
the literature shows that there is a tendency to use the phrase personally identifiable 
information (PII) interchangeably with personal information (PI) and sensitive 
information (SI) (Baker & Hostetler LLP, 2017; Humphreys, et al., 2014; Peppet, 2014; 
Schwartz & Solove, 2014) to describe essentially the same data points.  Social data is 
data collected from social media platforms (Constantiou & Kalinikos, 2015; Krombholz, 
Hobel, Huber, & Weippl, 2015; Mukkamala, Vatrapu, & Hussain, 2013).  This study will 
use the term social data to describe the data shared by organization executives via their 
personal SNS.  
Problem Statement 
 Executives’ use of personal SNS makes organizations more vulnerable to attacks.  In 
one such attack which took place for several months in 2018, a group of cybercriminals 
known as London Blue developed a list of over 50,000 finance executives to target 
(AGARI Data, 2018).  Of those potential targets, 71% carried the title of Chief Financial 
4 
 
Officer (CFO) (AGARI Data, 2018).  In March 2018, Pathe Cinemas lost more than 19 
million euros after cybercriminals targeted both their CFO and Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) for attack (Grooten, 2018).  After being fired by Pathe Cinemas, the CFO 
successfully sued his former employer for back wages for improper termination, resulting 
in an even more significant loss for the organization (Grooten, 2018).  In December 2018, 
the "Save the Children" charity organization disclosed they lost $1 million as the result of 
a business email compromise (BEC) attack (Wallack, 2018).  Industry professionals have 
made calls for corporate security teams to help senior executives improve their cyber 
hygiene because they unknowingly leak information via SNS and other means (Grunwitz, 
2018). 
 Extant literature sheds little light on the financial risks organizations face from their 
executives’ personal use of SNS.  Studies have explored the general need for social 
engineering training in the organizational context (Buckley, Nurse, Legg, Goldsmith, & 
Creese, 2014; Molok, Chang, & Ahmad, 2013), as well as the effectiveness of social 
engineering awareness training in general (Gardner & Thomas, 2014; Korpela, 2015; 
Rocha Flores & Ekstedt, 2016). Also, existing literature has examined organizational 
issues associated with the surveillance of personal SNS (Uldam, 2016).  Furthermore, 
existing literature has explored steps organizations can take to minimize the potential 
damage from social engineering attacks in general (Rocha Flores & Ekstedt, 2016; Vaast 
& Kaganer, 2013), as well as to understand the legalities surrounding organizational 
policies regarding employees use of their personal social media channels in non-work 
related situations (Sánchez Abril, Levin, & Del Riego, 2012).  To date, there has not been 
a systematic study that ties social engineering, organizational information security risk 
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assessment, and information security policies to better, more secure use of personal SNS 
by organizational executives.  The first step in that direction is understanding what 
executive SNS behaviors place organizations at risk. 
Dissertation Goal 
 The goal of this research study was to explore the types of executive SNS behaviors 
that might pose a financial risk to an organization.  
Research Question 
 This study answered the following research question: 
 RQ1:  What executive personal SNS behaviors pose financial risks to an 
organization? 
Relevance and Significance 
 This study advanced current research by gaining a deeper understanding of what 
executives' behaviors on SNS can post financial risks to an organization.  Organizations 
continue to be susceptible to attacks via the human element (Social-Engineer LLC, 2017).  
Documented incidents involving senior organizational management are plentiful (Atkins 
& Huang, 2013; Rivera, 2018).  Existing literature has explored the risks organizations 
face by way of their executives, as well as the roles they can play in helping to mitigate 
those risks (Brody, et al., 2012; Bronk, 2014; Buckley, et al., 2014; Burch, et al., 2015; 
Hsu, Shih, Hung, & Lowry, 2015).  This study helped inform academia as well as 
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practitioners by offering an emergent theoretical model that explores the financial risks 
organizations face from executives’ use of their personal SNS. 
Barriers and Issues 
 One barrier for this study was getting Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval to 
interview study respondents.  Since this research involved collecting potentially sensitive 
or embarrassing information, the researcher had to develop trust with respondents, 
demonstrate data safekeeping processes, and how the data collected would not put the 
respondent or the researcher at risk (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).  Another potential 
barrier to the study was the population size needed to complete the study.  As Creswell 
and Creswell (2018) noted, researchers must purposefully choose respondents for 
qualitative studies in order to help the researcher understand both the problem and the 
research question.   
Assumptions, Limitations and Delimitations 
Assumptions 
 The study has some assumptions.  One assumption is that that all respondents 
answered questions truthfully and honestly.  Another assumption is that respondents 
chosen to participate are representative of the overall population.  Yet another assumption 
is that the respondents possessed the necessary insight to provide valid responses.  
Limitations 
 The study has some limitations.  One limitation is the availability of respondents for 
recorded interviews.  To counter this limitation, the researcher was very flexible in 
scheduling interviews both in place and time.  Most interviews were done remotely via 
WebEx, but the researcher also traveled to conduct one interview in-person.  Another 
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limitation is the dearth of extant research available about organization executives’ use of 
SMS. 
Delimitations 
 The study has some delimitations.  One delimitation is that all respondents came from 
the United States.  As a result, conducting the same study in a different country could 
yield different findings.  A second delimitation is the work experience level of the 
respondents.  By requiring a minimum of five years of work experience, the study does 
not include data from respondents who may have valid insights but fail to meet the 
minimum experience threshold. 
Definition of Terms 
 Email Account Compromise (EAC) – A form of social engineering attack which 
targets employees who are authorized to perform EFT or wire transfer payments (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2017) 
 Information security – A well-informed sense of assurance that information risks and 
technical, formal and informal controls are in dynamic balance (Torres, Sarriegi, Santos, 
& Serrano, 2006) 
 Pretexting – A form of social engineering involving the creation of scenarios 
designed to convince the victim to perform the desired action (Brody, et al., 2012; 
Greitzer, et al., 2014; Luo, et al., 2011) 
 Risk – the possibility of an undesired outcome which results from an incident or 
occurrence, as determined by the likelihood and relevant consequences (Department of 
Homeland Security Risk Steering Committee, 2010) 
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 Social data - data which has collected from social media platforms (Constantiou & 
Kalinikos, 2015; Krombholz, et al., 2015; Mukkamala, et al., 2013) 
 Social engineering (SE) – deceptive practices designed to entice individuals to aid 
attackers in achieving their goals (Atkins & Huang, 2013) 
 Social network site(s) (SNS) – Web-based services that allow users to build a public 
or semi-public profile within a bounded system; create a list of other users they share a 
connection with; view their list as well as others (boyd & Ellison, 2007) 
List of Acronyms 
 BEC – Business email compromise 
 CEO – Chief executive officer 
 CFO – Chief financial officer 
 EAC – Email account compromise 
 IS – Information systems 
 PI – Personal information 
 PII – Personally identifiable information 
 SE – Social engineering 
 SI – Sensitive information 
 SNS – Social network site(s) 
Summary 
 This chapter discussed the background for the research topic, describing various 
information security threats to the organization, and how executive behaviors can pose a 
financial risk to the organization.  This chapter also laid out the foundation for the 
justification of the proposed study and described the research question to be studied.  
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Additionally, the relevance and significance of the study were discussed, as well as 
barriers and issues, which may affect the study.  Finally, definitions for specific terms 






Review of the Literature 
Introduction 
 This section will explore literature specific to information security as a defined 
concept, ways to classify organizations, organization executives, and how they differ 
from rank-and-file employees, organizational information disclosure, and organizational 
risk. The literature search focused primarily, but not exclusively, on the Association for 
Information Systems (AIS) Senior Scholars’ Basket of Journals list (Association for 
Information Systems, 2011).  The literature review supports the researcher’s position that 
a gap in the literature exists at the intersection of executive SNS behaviors and the 
potential financial risks they pose to an organization. 
Information Security definition 
 Based on a review of the literature, the term information security, while frequently 
used, lacks a seminal definition or explanation.  Existing literature observed that the term 
is a concept that lacks a clear-cut definition (Anderson, 2003; Torres, et al., 2006).  
Dlamini, Eloff, and Eloff (2009) found that the concept of information security predates 
the invention of the computer.  Interestingly, there are numerous articles (Crossler et al., 
2013; Johnston, Warkentin, & Siponen, 2015; Lowry, Posey, Bennett, & Roberts, 2015; 
Rocha Flores & Ekstedt, 2016) which use the term information security without ever 
supplying a definition, thus leaving it to the reader to interpret its meaning through their 
lenses and experiences.  
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 Anderson (2003) observed that previous attempts to define information security were 
overly broad.  Subsequently, Anderson (2003, p. 310) offered his definition of 
information security as being "…A well-informed sense of assurance that information 
risks and controls are in balance".  Torres, et al. (2006, p. 532) offered a definition similar 
to that offered by Anderson (2003), "Information security is a well-informed sense of 
assurance that information risks and technical, formal and informal controls are in 
dynamic balance." 
 Further complicating the issue of defining information security is the increasing use 
of the terms cybersecurity or cyber security.  Agresti (2010) and von Solms and van 
Niekerk (2013) both noted that these terms might be viewed by some as having the same 
meaning, thus making their usage interchangeable.  Agresti (2010) also went on to note 
that the use of the term cybersecurity is increasingly replacing information security as the 
default term.  Bronk (2014) observed that the term cyber security could have different 
meanings to different market sectors, as well as to nation-states when considering 
national defense concerns.  von Solms and van Niekerk (2013) explored the differences 
between the terms information security and cyber security/cybersecurity, concluded there 
is a difference between the terms, and thus not interchangeable.  Similar to the 
observation made previously, numerous articles used the term cybersecurity or cyber 
security without defining it (Carlton & Levy, 2015).  This study will use the definition of 
information security as offered by Torres, et al. (2006).  By extension, we will define an 
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information security risk as any activity that could potentially disrupt the aforementioned 
dynamic balance. 
Social Networking Sites (SNS) 
 Existing literature has explored several different themes related to SNS.  This section 
will cover some of those themes, including challenges and benefits of enterprise SNS 
usage; benefits of SNS data available to organizations; personal risks associated with 
information shared via SNS; emotional benefits and challenges associated with SNS; 
SNS privacy policy impact on users’ willingness to share personal information; and 
employee benefits from using SNS. 
 Leonardi (2015) examined the benefits of organizationally restricted SNS, focusing 
on the benefits of ambient knowledge gained by employee SNS interaction.  According to 
Leonardi (2015), employees using SNS to interact internally can gain a degree of ambient 
awareness, which he described as an understanding of who knows what (also described as 
organizational metaknowledge) within an organization.  Choudrie and Zamani (2016) 
explored the challenges of organizationally restricted SNS use within the workplace.  
Choudrie and Zamani (2016) found that the implantation of SNS software in the 
workplace can be challenging.  In order to benefit from SNS software usage, the 
organization must take the proper steps to highlight the benefits associated with its usage 
(Choudrie & Zamani, 2016).  Forsgren and Byström (2017) explored the benefits 
associated with organizationally restricted SNS usage by conducting a case study of a 
Scandinavian software company.  By exploring the environment through the lens of 
activity theory, Forsgren and Byström (2017) discovered that SNS usage within the 
organization made work-related activities more coherent, even in environments where the 
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SNS was not optimized.   
 Pike, Bateman, and Butler (2017) explored how organizations use information from 
external SNS to assist in the hiring process of job candidates.  Pike, et al. (2017) found 
that while information collected on job candidates via SNS can be beneficial, hiring 
managers must be careful to evaluate the quality of the information collected holistically.  
Specifically, information collected from sources which evidenced a high degree of 
context collapse may increase the amount of ambiguity in the decision-making process, 
as opposed to reducing it. 
 Wakefield (2013) examined how user affect impacted the desire to disclose 
information online.  Wakefield (2013) found that when users had a pleasant experience 
using a website, privacy concerns decreased, and their perception of trust increased.  As a 
result of the pleasant experience, users were more likely to share personal information 
with the website (Wakefield, 2013).  Chen, Lu, Chau, and Gupta (2014), as well as 
Heravi, Mubarak, and Choo (2018) explored how personal risks associated with 
information shared via SNS help shape user intent to use SNS.  Both Chen, et al. (2014) 
and Heravi, et al. (2018) confirmed that perceived cyber risks from sharing information 
played a critical role in user determination about SNS usage.  Hu, Kettinger, and Poston 
(2015) examined the role that perceived information risk played in user decision-making 
regarding the use of SNS.  Hu, et al. (2015) found that users believed the benefits 
associated with SNS usage outweighed the risks associated with sharing their personal 
information.  Gerlach, Widjaja, and Buxmann (2015) explored the impact of SNS privacy 
policies on user intention to share personal information.  Gerlach, et al. (2015) found that 
the permissiveness of a SNS privacy policy negatively impacted a user’s desire to share 
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personal information.  However, Gerlach, et al. (2015) also found that the perceived risks 
associated with the privacy policy served as a mediating factor in user desire to share 
personal information.  Gao, Liu, Guo, and Li (2018) explored issues of ubiquitous 
connectivity to SNS via mobile devices.  According to Gao, et al. (2018), ubiquitous 
connectivity to SNS can result in negative psychological impacts on users, as well as 
inadvertent leakage of personal information.   
 Matook, Cummings, and Bala (2015) examined how personal SNS usage impacted 
user perceptions of loneliness.  Matook, et al. (2015) found that employees who travel 
frequently may suffer greater feelings of loneliness and that organizations may benefit 
from encouraging SNS usage in these cases.  Additionally, Matook, et al. (2015) 
recommended that organizations should focus on creating policies which encourage 
positive outcomes from employee use of SNS.  Ali-Hassan, et al. (2015) examined 
employee use of personal SNS in the workplace and the associated impact on the 
organization.  Ali-Hassan, et al. (2015) found that hedonic use of personal SNS in the 
workplace had mixed results, with a negative impact on employee productivity, but a 
positive impact on employee creativity as well as an increase in employee social capital.  
Ali-Hassan, et al. (2015) also recommended organizations encourage the use of personal 
SNS during work hours, and to allow the line between work and personal social activities 
to blur, to have a positive impact on overall job performance.  Turel and Qahri-Saremi 
(2016) probed the problematic issues associated with SNS usage concerning 
undergraduate student academic performance.  Turel and Qahri-Saremi (2016) supported 
the idea that educational institutions should focus on helping students find ways to 
control problematic information systems (IS) usage while enrolled, and beyond.  
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Wakefield and Wakefield (2016) explored the impact of user passion and affect on SNS 
usage.  Surprisingly, one finding in the Wakefield and Wakefield (2016) study was there 
was no relationship between user excitement about an event and SNS usage at the event. 
However, Wakefield and Wakefield (2016) found that while excitement may not directly 
induce SNS usage at an event, it may contribute to a belief that the event is conducive to 
meet some need, which would lead to SNS usage.   
 As the literature shows, SNS presents both benefits and challenges to employees and 
organizations.  Employees can benefit both personally and professionally from SNS 
usage, and so are inclined to use it.  The literature also shows that organizations can be 
put at risk from SNS usage.  What is unexplored in the literature is the financial risk that 
organizations can face as a result of their executives’ use of personal SNS. 
Organization classification 
 Existing literature reveals that various criteria can be used to classify organizations in 
different ways.  As Flack (2016) noted, the classification of organizations can occur 
across multiple considerations such as the number of employees, annual revenue, as well 
as the number of locations, and these considerations can vary by industry.  National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (2011) published a report that focused on the 
management of information security risk from the organizational view.  National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (2011) outlined different sectors for organizational 
groupings, such as legal, finance, information technology, and regulatory compliance, 
among others, and stated that managing information security risks required expertise 
specific to that particular sector.  
 Buonanno et al. (2005) explored different ways in which organizations could be 
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classified by exploring existing IS literature through the lens of enterprise resource 
planning (ERP) adoption.  Buonanno, et al. (2005) found discussed classification criteria 
for organizations, such as company size, market area, membership in an industrial group, 
the presence of branch offices, diversification level, and the degree of functional 
extension.  Flack (2016) echoed some, but not all, of these same criteria.  
 J. W. Lee, Seong, and Lee (2012) explored the ways organizations can be classified 
through the lens of human resources management.  J. W. Lee, et al. (2012) explored 
existing taxonomy for organization classification by way of literature review and 
discovered it was lacking.  According to J. W. Lee, et al. (2012), existing organization 
taxonomy literature failed to scientifically group organizations, thus exposing a gap in the 
literature. 
 According to DeSalvo, Limehouse, and Klimek (2016), the United States Census 
Bureau classified organizations by industrial sector, the legal form of the organization, as 
well as federal tax status.  Quttainah and Paczkowski (2014) explored the ways privately 
held organizations could be classified while undergoing valuation for potential purchase.  
As Quttainah and Paczkowski (2014) noted, rational business owners will choose to seek 
the highest value for their organization at the time of sale, but if both parties cannot agree 
on a price, they may call an appraiser in to offer input.  As part of this process, appraisers 
may classify an organization based on criteria such as cash flow, the effectiveness of 
current management, and the uncertainty associated with the span of control to be held by 
the owner post-sale (Quttainah & Paczkowski, 2014). 
 Extant literature showed multiple methods by which organizations can be classified.  
The literature also showed that the management of information security risks required 
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expertise specific to that classification.  Thus, it is important to research financial risks 
for organizations across a diverse set of organizational classifications in order for the 
results to be both rigorous and generalizable. 
Organization executives 
 Existing literature has explored organization executives through multiple lenses.  As 
early as Hambrick (1981), literature explored the impact that executives had on the 
success of their organization.  The seminal work of Hambrick and Mason (1984), which 
offered the Upper Echelons perspective model, served as a foundation for exploring 
various ways to predict organizational outcomes.  According to Hambrick and Mason 
(1984), organizational outcomes are reflections of top managers and their values.   
Hambrick and Mason (1984) also argued that the behavior and characteristics of 
executives mattered as it related to organizational outcomes.  Hambrick and Mason 
(1984) theorized that top managers made strategic choices that would impact the 
performance of the organization.  According to Hambrick and Mason (1984), the success 
or failure of these choices could be partially predicted based on observable criteria such 
as age, functional tracks, prior career experiences, education level, socioeconomic 
background, financial position, and group characteristics. 
 Hambrick and Mason (1984) referenced existing literature with conflicting findings.  
Notably, Hall (1977) argued that organizations effectively run themselves in the form of 
inertia and are mostly immune to executive behaviors.  Additionally, Hannan and 
Freeman (1977) used an ecological lens to examine organizational behavior and found 
that organization executives fail to substantially impact outcomes due to both internal and 
external pressures which impact the organization, and are outside of executive control.  
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As Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) noted, researchers attempted to bridge the gap 
between these two competing views by offering a contingency approach.  According to 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990), the concept of managerial discretion was a theory to 
bridge this gap.  Building on prior literature, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) refined the 
Upper Echelons perspective model, by offering managerial discretion as a moderating 
variable.  Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) described managerial discretion as the degree 
of freedom available to top executives to make decisions.  According to Finkelstein and 
Hambrick (1990), in situations where managerial discretion was low, executive 
effectiveness was limited, and the Upper Echelons perspective model did not hold up 
well and was unable to explain the situation adequately.  However, Finkelstein and 
Hambrick (1990) observed that in situations where managerial discretion was high, 
executive effectiveness was not limited, and the Upper Echelons perspective model held 
up well and was able to explain the situation adequately.  Hambrick, Finkelstein, and 
Mooney (2005) further refined the Upper Echelons perspective model by introducing 
executive job demands as an additional moderating variable.  According to Hambrick, et 
al. (2005), executives who faced heavy job demands would take mental shortcuts, and 
rely on solutions they had seen work successfully in the past, so their backgrounds and 
prior experiences effectively colored their decisions.  However, Hambrick, et al. (2005) 
found that executives with lighter job demands had the flexibility and freedom to be more 
comprehensive in their analyses and were ultimately better positioned to make a decision 
that more objectively addressed the situation at hand. 
 Building on Hambrick and Mason (1984), Hambrick, et al. (2005) argued that senior 
executives are of specific interest because they serve as an interface between the 
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organization and its environment, and wield sufficient power to impact the organization.  
According to Hambrick, et al. (2005), executive-level work is qualitatively different from 
work found at other levels of the organization.  Hambrick, et al. (2005) also found that 
executive leadership behaviors could impact both the vitality and performance of their 
organization and thus warranted further examination. 
 Organization executives are of particular interest to adversaries, because of the level 
of access and oversight they have.  Krombholz, et al. (2015) outlined whaling attacks, a 
type of phishing attack, which targets organization executives explicitly.  Adversaries can 
use whaling attacks to achieve different goals.  For example, Hong (2012) described 
whaling attacks targeting chief operating officers (CEOs) with fake subpoenas as email 
attachments, which had malware installed.  In 2016, a finance executive at Mattel was the 
victim of a whaling attack, nearly resulting in a loss of $3 million via EFT (Associated 
Press, 2016).  Holland, Amado, and Marriott (2018) reported on cybercriminals offering 
access to executive email accounts for as little as $150. 
Organizational information disclosure 
 A review of the literature regarding organizational information disclosure revealed 
the presence of multiple themes in the space.  This section will review some of those 
themes, which include organizational challenges in responding to customer privacy 
concerns, challenges present in protecting organizational data, and the possible market 
reactions organizations face when they suffer from unauthorized disclosure of 
information.  
 Greenaway and Chan (2013) proposed a framework that organizations could use to 
create a customer data privacy policy.  Greenaway, Chan, and Crossler (2015) were able 
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to utilize a case study methodology to provide six lessons learned to assist organizations 
in overcoming challenges associated with maintaining their customer data privacy 
initiatives.  Wakefield (2013) studied the effect of user affect in the disclosure of personal 
information on commercial websites. Among the findings, Wakefield (2013) observed 
that users were more likely to disclose personal information to a website if their initial 
experience with the website was enjoyable, even if the user was not familiar with any 
organizational policies regarding the safekeeping of users personal information.  The 
impact of user affect on personal information disclosure was explored by Kehr, 
Kowatsch, Wentzel, and Fleisch (2015).  Similar to the findings in the Wakefield (2013) 
study, Kehr, et al. (2015) found that users were more likely to disclose personal 
information when in a positive affective state while using an information system.  
Greenaway, et al. (2015) proposed a conceptual framework to help organizations 
reconcile their legal and ethical responsibilities to customers concerning their personal 
data, and organizational responsibilities to adhere to internal information management 
objectives.  Among their findings, Greenaway, et al. (2015) observed that organizations 
need to make a fundamental determination as to whose interests they are operating in, 
how they will use the information collected, and to what degree they should extend 
beyond any legal requirements in order to provide a higher degree of protection for their 
customer's personal data. 
 Organizations also face challenges in regards to protecting corporate data.  Conger, 
Pratt, and Loch (2013) explored the challenges organizations face in protecting corporate 
data.  Among their findings in this area, Conger, et al. (2013) noted that data collection 
and sharing among organizations, combined with the growing number of methods to 
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customer data, pose a significant challenge to organizations in their efforts to protect data 
collected.  Hsu, et al. (2015) studied the effectiveness of extra-role behaviors exhibited by 
organization workers as they relate to information security policy effectiveness.  Defined 
as employee behaviors that extend beyond those described in organizational security 
policies, Hsu, et al. (2015) found that when combined with in-role behaviors, extra-role 
behaviors have a positive impact on organizational security policy effectiveness.  Lowry 
and Moody (2015) proposed a new model which examined employee motivations, in an 
attempt to determine employee intent to comply with new organization security policies.  
This model, which combined control theory with reactance theory, found that 
organizational controls were a positive predictor of an employee’s intent to comply with 
new security policy, while perceived threats to personal freedom resulted in employee 
reactance to new security policy.  Lowry, et al. (2015) explored how organizations could 
leverage fairness theory and reactive theory to increase the likelihood that employees 
would adhere to organizational security policies.  Among their findings, Lowry, et al. 
(2015) discovered that employees were more likely to adhere to organizational security 
policies if an atmosphere of organization trust existed.  Lowry, et al. (2015) found that 
one method to increase the level of organizational trust was through the implementation 
of explanation adequacy, used to inform employees of the underlying reason and 
subsequent importance of organizational security policy.  C. H. Lee, Geng, and 
Raghunathan (2016) examined the impact of mandatory standards on the effectiveness of 
organizational information security.  Among their findings, C. H. Lee, et al. (2016) 
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reported that the implementation of a higher security standard does not necessarily lead to 
an increase in security for an organization. 
 Existing literature has also explored the marketplace consequences organizations can 
face after suffering a data breach.  Wang, Kannan, and Ulmer (2013) examined the 
impact organizations may face when publicly disclosing a data breach event.  Wang, et 
al. (2013) found no significant difference in marketplace reaction when an organization 
disclosed a data breach in financial reporting documents, but that the marketplace did 
respond differently when an organization announced a breach outside the release of 
financial reporting documents.  
Summary 
 Overall, the review of the literature revealed a gap in the understanding of the 
financial risks that organizations face from executives’ use of personal SNS.  This gap 
merited further exploration and supported the justification for this study.  The literature 
review showed that the actions of their executives’ impact organizations.  Specifically, 
the literature review showed that executives merit specific scrutiny because they interface 
between the organization and its environment and are powerful enough to impact the 
organization.  Furthermore, executive-level work is different from the work done by 
others in the organization.  Next, the literature review showed that executive behaviors 
could impact the performance of their organization, and thus warranted further 
examination.  Additionally, the literature review showed the lack of a seminal definition 
of information security, thus making it difficult for organizations to approach the concept 
in a coherent, organized manner.  Finally, the literature review showed that organizations 
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face challenges in protecting their data and that they can suffer negative financial impacts 








 This chapter discusses the methodology used for this research study.  This chapter 
also contains details about the research methodology employed and how the researcher 
developed and validated the research instrument.  Additionally, population and sample 
size is discussed.  Next, this chapter discusses how collected research data was analyzed.  
Finally, this chapter discusses the resources used to conduct this research study. 
Overview of research methodology and design 
 According to Creswell and Creswell (2018), researchers should identify their 
worldview as a fundamental component of any study they conduct. Creswell and 
Creswell (2018) identify four distinct worldviews:  Postpositivism, Constructivism, 
Transformative, and Pragmatism.  Creswell and Creswell (2018) describe the 
constructivist worldview as an approach typically used with qualitative research.  
Constructivist researchers do not start with a theory, instead choosing to generate or 
develop a theory based on observations (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).  Based on this 
description, Constructivist was the researcher’s worldview for this study. 
 Grounded theory methods (GTM) were first proposed by Glaser and Strauss (1967), 
although they have since split into two distinct camps after a public falling out between 
Glaser and Strauss over fundamental issues (Urquhart, Lehmann, & Myers, 2009).  
Matavire and Brown (2017) outlined subsequent advances in GTM, referring to the two 
camps as “classic” and “evolved.”  According to Matavire and Brown (2017), the work of 
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Charmaz and others falls into the “evolved” faction of GTM, and are the methods used 
for this study.  GTM can apply to both qualitative and quantitative research data 
(Charmaz, 1995).  GTM emphasizes theory development and allows researchers to aim at 
various levels of theory when conducting research (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994).  The use of 
GTM allows the researcher to discover concepts that are grounded in collected data, as 
well as determining their underlying sources (Corbin & Strauss, 1990).  Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) argued that GTM could be used to develop new theory by focusing on the 
differences between daily realities of behaviors and how those behaviors are interpreted 
by those who engage in those behaviors (Suddaby, 2006).  When used correctly, GTM 
can produce high-level theories that are generalizable and useful (Urquhart & Fernández, 
2013).  Because there is little understanding of the degree of financial risk posed to an 
organization by way of executives’ use of SNS, the use of GTM provided an avenue to 
determine the answer to the research question for this study. 
Research methods employed 
 This study of financial risks associated with executive use of SNS was qualitative.  
Data collection focused on the specific behaviors that executives can engage in via SNS 
usage, which could result in financial risks to an organization. 
 This study advanced current research by gaining a deeper understanding of how 
executives' behaviors on SNS impact financial risks to the organization.  This deeper 
understanding came about as a result of collecting examples of executive behaviors from 
information security professionals, which they believe could pose a financial risk to the 
organization.  The researcher conducted semi-structured interviews using open-ended 
questions to collect data about these behaviors.  This study collected the perceptions of 
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the respondents interviewed to answer the research question and to help build an 
emergent theoretical model to assist organizations in dealing with financial risks 
associated with executives’ use of SNS. 
 A qualitative research approach was justified for this study, in part to help inform the 
emergent theoretical model for the study.  Additionally, a qualitative research approach 
was needed to collect data about executive SNS behaviors that may pose a financial risk 
to the organization.  The researcher used semi-structured interviews to collect the 
qualitative data needed for this study.  Interviews do come with associated risks: 
artificiality of the interview, lack of trust; lack of time; level of entry; elite bias; 
Hawthorne effects, constructing knowledge, ambiguity of language, and interview 
abandonment by the interviewee (Myers & Newman, 2007). 
Instrument development and validation 
 Boudreau, Gefen, and Straub (2001) observed, IS researchers should seek to ensure 
research is rigorous, by validating the instruments used to collect data.  Venkatesh, 
Brown, and Bala (2013) noted that researchers should discuss the validity of design, 
analysis, and findings within the separate contexts of both qualitative and quantitative 
research.  Straub, Boudreau, and Gefen (2004) offered a set of guidelines for ensuring 
research validity.  According to Straub, et al. (2004), construct validity, internal 
consistency, inter-rater reliability, and statistical conclusion validity are mandatory. 
 The researcher used a list of open-ended interview questions for this study.  The 
interview guide was first tested with two subject matter experts to assess the types of 
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questions, validity, and reliability of the data, which resulted in minimal changes to the 
interview guide prior to use.  
 Descriptive demographic data about study respondents was collected prior to the 
interview by use of a Qualtrics survey instrument.  Collected data included age range, 
education level, ethnicity, gender, household income, industry currently employed in, and 
details regarding their career to ensure they met population requirements for this study 
prior to being interviewed.  
Population and sample 
 Creswell and Creswell (2018) identified the key aspects of population and sampling 
to describe a research plan adequately.  Those aspects are described below and were 
applied to this study. 
Population description 
 The population for this study consisted of individuals who identify as information 
security professionals currently working in-field or did so within the last 24 months.  
Additionally, the population had sufficient work experience in the information security 
field, such that it allowed them to speak from a place of authority as it related to 
executive SNS behaviors they have either witnessed directly or have heard related 
examples of executive SNS behaviors from others that they found to be credible.  In order 
to meet this criterion, the population had a minimum of five years of information 
security-related work experience. 
Sampling techniques 
 Single-stage sample design is appropriate when the researcher has access to the 
population and can sample them directly (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).  Because of the 
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researcher’s direct and indirect access to the population, a single-stage sample design was 
the appropriate choice for this study.  Creswell and Creswell (2018) described three types 
of sampling:  random, systemic, and nonprobability.  As Creswell and Creswell (2018) 
noted, obtaining a random sample may be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.  The 
ability to generate a systemic sample will also prove to be problematic, as well.  
Accordingly, the researcher used a nonprobability sample technique to select respondents 
for this study.  While nonprobability sampling is not the optimal choice, Creswell and 
Creswell (2018) noted that it is a frequently used method to choose respondents.  Sample 
size determination needed to be taken into account as well.  As Creswell and Creswell 
(2018) observed, sample size determination is a tradeoff between more accuracy, time, 
and cost. 
 Qualitative research uses the concept of saturation to help determine sample size 
(Mason, 2010).  Charmaz (2006) observed that reaching saturation can be a function of 
the aims of a study, thus making the sample size difficult to determine.  Brinkmann and 
Kvale (2015) suggested that general interview studies need between 5 and 25 interviews. 
While the researcher anticipated data saturation at 15 respondents, data saturation 
occurred after the ninth respondent at which time the researcher discontinued interviews.  
Data collection 
 Data collection initiated with the identification of subject matter experts in the field of 
information security.  The researcher identified a total of 21 individuals as potential study 
respondents.  Next, the researcher asked these individuals to participate in this study, with 
all of them agreeing to do so.  Once the individuals agreed to participate, they were sent a 
link to a Qualtrics survey instrument used to collect demographic data.  The researcher 
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scheduled interviews after verifying the respondent submitted demographic data.  The 
anticipated time for interviews was 30-45 minutes, with actual times ranging from 25-55 
minutes.  The researcher conducted interviews between February 2019 and March of 
2020.  The researcher conducted one interview in-person and the rest via WebEx online 
meeting software.  Interviews were conducted only after obtaining informed consent from 
the respondent and were recorded with the respondent’s permission.  Interviews and 
initial coding were conducted in the same period, to minimize the amount of time needed 
to collect data and begin the initial coding process.  When needed, follow-up questions 
were sent to respondents via email to gain further insight into topics. 
 Respondents ranged in age from mid-20s to mid-50s.  All respondents had some level 
of college education, with most of them completing either a bachelor’s or master’s 
degree.  The respondents were mostly male, and all had at least five years of information 
security work experience.  Over half of the respondents reported having more than ten 
years of industry experience. 
 At the conclusion of each interview, the researcher reviewed the resulting audio file 
to ensure successful recording.  Next, the researcher sent the audio file to a paid 
transcription service, which returned a transcript within one day.  The researcher 
reviewed the transcripts for accuracy and allowed the respondent to do the same.  After 
verification, the researcher imported the transcript into ATLAS.ti, a qualitative data 
analysis application.  The use of ATLAS.ti allowed the researcher to code interviews, 
sort, and explore the data in order to discover themes, categories, and relationships. 
 The researcher interviewed a total of nine respondents.  The first interview was a pilot 
in order to ensure the interview script would meet study objectives.  The researcher sent 
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the first transcript to an experienced academic researcher for validation that the research 
question was being addressed.  
Data analysis 
 Data analysis should follow generally acceptable standards (Pratt, 2009; Romano Jr., 
Donovan, Chen, & Nunamaker Jr., 2003; Venkatesh, et al., 2013).  Qualitative data is so 
rich that researchers should aggregate it into somewhere between five and seven distinct 
themes (Creswell & Creswell, 2018).  Researchers should use qualitative software in 
order to ease the burden of data analysis (Bringer, Johnston, & Brackenridge, 2006; 
Creswell & Creswell, 2018; Peters & Wester, 2007; Romano Jr., et al., 2003).  The use of 
qualitative software is especially appropriate when using GTM (Bringer, et al., 2006).  
Creswell and Creswell (2018) outline a five-step process to analyze qualitative data, 
which includes:  organizing and preparing data for analysis; read or look at the data; data 
coding; generating a description and themes; representing the description and themes. 
 Interviews were electronically recorded and sent out for professional transcription in 
order to add validity to the process.  Additionally, the researcher addressed 
trustworthiness and authenticity concerns by sending transcripts to the respondents to 
ensure the accuracy of the data before analysis.  The researcher then imported transcripts 
into ATLAS.ti, a qualitative data analysis application. 
 Coding was done in three phases, as described by Charmaz (2006): initial coding, 
focused coding, and theoretical coding.  Charmaz (2006) acknowledged the concept of 
axial coding, which exists in the Strauss and Corbin version of GTM but described it as 
optional.  Coding is a non-linear process in GTM, and researchers should feel free to 
move between coding methods as needed (Thornberg & Charmaz, 2012).  Coding allows 
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researchers to begin understanding what is happening in the data and to understand what 
it means (Charmaz, 2006). 
 Initial coding is the process by which researchers begin to apply labels to data in 
order to allow further exploration.  Initial coding allows researchers to gradually analyze 
and interpret respondents’ concerns regarding the problem being explored (Thornberg & 
Charmaz, 2012).  Focused coding is the process of taking codes generated in the initial 
coding process and using them to sift through large amounts of data (Charmaz, 1995).  
Theoretical coding allows researchers to highlight possible relationships between codes 
developed during the focused coding phase, and to help tell a story in a theoretical 
direction (Charmaz, 2006). 
 The researcher initially coded all interviews.  Those initial codes revealed basic 
concepts that the researcher then compiled and reviewed to address redundancy and 
overlap.  To address validity and reliability concerns, the researcher had a subject matter 
expert also engage in initial coding of all interviews, using a codebook developed by the 
researcher during his initial coding process.  As McDonald, Schoenebeck, and Forte 
(2019) observed, agreement between coders is an important part of qualitative research.  
Agreement on codes by multiple people indicates consistency in the measurements 
(McDonald, et al., 2019).  When disagreement amongst coders exists, there are multiple 
methods available to resolve the disagreement (MacPhail, Khoza, Abler, & Ranganathan, 
2015; McDonald, et al., 2019; Wiesche, Jurisch, Yetton, & Krcmar, 2017).  For this 
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study, the researcher chose the meet/discuss/resolve approach as described in both 
McDonald, et al. (2019) and Wiesche, et al. (2017). 
 According to Creswell and Creswell (2018), researchers can measure intercoder 
agreement by using any reliability process checking present in qualitative data analysis 
applications.  Process checking was available in the ATLAS.ti software used for this 
study, specifically Krippendorff’s alpha.  The use of Krippendorff’s alpha is supported in 
studies where two coders are coding the same data, and the data are nominal (McDonald, 
et al., 2019).  According to Krippendorff (2004), an alpha score of .800 or greater is 
needed to ensure minimal agreement amongst coders. 
 Once the initial coding of all interviews was completed, the researcher moved on to 
focused coding to develop themes that represented a common thread or idea.  Finally, the 
researcher utilized theoretical coding to develop the overarching dimensions which were 
used to create the emergent theoretical model. 
Resource requirements 
 Resources were needed to complete this study.  Computing-based resources used 
included a computer, word processing software, citation management software, Internet 
connectivity, transcription services, video conferencing software, online survey tools, 
corresponding survey tool delivery mechanisms, and statistical analysis software.  Human 
resources used included industry professionals in order to assist with instrument 
validation, as well a serving as respondents.  Additionally, human resources were needed 
in the form of subject matter experts to assist with intercoder agreement of the results.  
The computing-based resources were owned by the researcher, or available to him at no 
charge because of his employment at a Georgia-based public university.  The human 
33 
 
resources were available as well, due to the numerous connections the researcher has to 
the metro Atlanta area information security community, as well as having a substantial 
global social media footprint via LinkedIn and Twitter. 
Summary 
 This chapter provided an overview of the research methodology, which was used for 
this study.  The research methodology for this study was discussed.  Instrument 
development and validation for this study were also discussed.  Population, sample size, 
and sampling techniques for this study were also discussed.  Finally, the data analysis 








 This chapter discusses the results of data analysis and findings for this research study.  
The chapter explains the analysis method followed.  Next, the chapter discusses the 
demographic analysis that was conducted.  A discussion of the detailed results of the 
findings follows next.  Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the results. 
Data analysis 
 The researcher conducted data analysis on respondent interview data, respondent 
demographic data, and interview data coding.  By using grounded theory methods 
(GTM), concepts and themes emerged from the data, which ultimately led to the 
discovery of overarching dimensions.  The discovery of these overarching dimensions led 
to the creation of an emergent theoretical model to explain the results. 
 Data analysis began with the researcher commencing with the initial coding process, 
as described by Charmaz (2006).  The researcher conducted initial data coding of each 
interview immediately after receiving the professionally transcribed recording and 
allowed the respondent to review it, thus addressing any concerns related to validity and 
reliability.  This process allowed the researcher to analyze the data using GTM and code 
the interview data to discover relevant concepts, themes, and overarching dimensions.  
As a result, interviews and initial coding overlapped as the researcher both continued to 
engage in respondent interviews while also conducting initial data analysis.  This overlap 
was necessary, as it allowed the researcher to discover relevant concepts more quickly, as 
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well as to ascertain when data saturation occurred.  Coding was done in three phases, as 
described by Charmaz (2006): initial coding, focused coding, and theoretical coding.  
Charmaz (2006) acknowledged the concept of axial coding, which exists in the Strauss 
and Corbin version of GTM but described it as optional. 
The discovery of the overarching dimensions present in the data led to the development 
of an emergent theoretical model that may be used by future researchers and practitioners 
to assist with protecting organizations from financial risks associated with executives’ 
use of their personal SNS channels. 
Demographic analysis 
 Demographic data was collected prior to the interview by use of a Qualtrics survey 
tool.  Prior to analysis, data accuracy was checked by ensuring that no respondent had left 
any portion of the survey blank.  Once the data was verified, analysis commenced.  Table 
1 provides a breakdown of descriptive statistics for all respondents.  Respondents' ages 
ranged from the mid-20s to early 60s.  Eight of the respondents identified their gender as 
male, and one identified as female.  Two respondents had some level of college education 
but did not complete a degree of any type.  Three respondents had a bachelor’s degree, 
and four respondents had a master’s degree.  Respondents reported working in various 
industries, including educational services, financial services, and information services. 
 This sample is reflective of the information security industry in terms of gender, 
ethnicity, educational level, and industry verticals.  The sample for this study was 89% 
male and 11% female.  These numbers are similar to the 80% male and 20% female 
gender breakdown reported by The United States Census Bureau (2020a) for information 
security analysts in 2017.  The sample is also reflective of the information security 
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industry in terms of race and ethnicity.  The ethnicity breakdown for the sample was 78% 
White, 11% Asian, and 11% Black or African American.  The United States Census 
Bureau (2020c) reported the 2017 race and ethnicity breakdown for information security 
analysts as 73.9% White, 9.52% Asian, and 12.5% Black.  Next, the sample is reflective 
of the information security industry in terms of educational level.  77% of the sample 
reported having a bachelor’s degree or higher.  This is similar to The Occupational 
Information Network (2019) finding that 76% of information security analysts have a 
Bachelor’s degree or higher.  Finally, the sample is reflective of the information security 
industry in terms of the representation of industry verticals.  The industry breakdown for 
the sample was 11% educational services, 11% financial services, 33% information-
related services, and 44% professional, scientific or technical services.  These numbers 
closely relate findings reported by The United States Census Bureau (2020b) of 10% 
educational services, 18% financial services, 33% information-related services, and 44% 
professional, scientific or technical services.  The single noteworthy exception here is the 
difference in the information-related services field, but otherwise, the sample is reflective 





Descriptive Statistics for the Population (N=9)   
Characteristic N Percentage (%) 
Age   
25-34 2 22% 
35-44 3 33% 
45-54 2 22% 
55-64 2 22% 
   
Gender   
Female 1 11% 
Male 8 89% 
   
Ethnicity    
White 7 78% 
Asian 1 11% 
Black or African American 1 11% 
   
Education   
Some college, no degree 2 22% 
Bachelor's degree 3 33% 
Master's degree 4 44% 
   
Industry   
Educational services 1 11% 
Financial services 1 11% 
Information 3 33% 
Professional, scientific or technical services 4 44% 
   
Industry experience   
5-6 years 2 22% 
7-8 years 2 22% 
Longer than 10 years 5 56% 
 
Respondent interview data analysis 
 Using ATLAS.ti for data analysis, the researcher engaged in the process of initial 
coding on each interview immediately after being transcribed.  As Charmaz (2006) noted, 
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the use of initial coding allows the researcher to compile data into categories and discover 
the existence of any processes that are present in the data.  While engaged in the initial 
coding process, the researcher also applied constant comparative methods, as described 
by Charmaz (2006).  When using constant comparative methods, researchers begin to 
establish distinctions in the data, which allows the researcher to make comparisons at 
each coding level (Charmaz, 2006). 
 The researcher recruited a subject matter expert to engage in initial coding of all 
interviews in order to ensure the validity and reliability of the results.  This process took 
place in batches of two interviews at a time, whereby the researcher engaged in initial 
coding of two interviews, which were then handed off to the subject matter expert for 
them to initially code.  The researcher supplied the codebook for the subject matter expert 
use, which was generated from the researcher’s initial codes.  Having agreement between 
coders is an important component of any qualitative research effort (McDonald, et al., 
2019; Wiesche, et al., 2017).  This iterative process allowed for the resolution of any 
differences in coding, which is needed to ensure reliability in the results (MacPhail, et al., 
2015). 
 When coding conflicts occurred, the researcher and the subject matter expert would 
meet via telephone, or remote messaging services like Microsoft Teams or Signal, to 
discuss the conflict and reach consensus.  Coding conflicts occurred in three rounds of 
interview coding, resulting in the researcher and the subject matter expert meeting for a 
total of approximately 90 minutes across three separate meetings.  In total, 169 codes 
were identified during the initial coding phase, and are shown in Appendix D.  The 
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resulting initial coding process identified the existence of basic concepts that respondents 
identified during their interviews. 
 Researchers can measure intercoder agreement by using reliability process checking 
tools that are present in qualitative data analysis applications (Creswell & Creswell, 
2018).  Such a reliability process checking tool was available in ATLAS.ti, namely 
Krippendorff’s alpha.  Krippendorff (2004) stated that an alpha score of .800 or greater is 
needed to ensure minimal agreement between coders.  The Krippendorff’s alpha score of 
.874 was calculated after the initial coding and conflict resolution process, thus 
confirming intercoder agreement in the initial coding process.  
 From there, the researcher moved on to focused coding of the data.  Focused coding 
allows the researcher to begin data synthesis and understanding larger segments of data 
(Charmaz, 2006).  The comparison of data against data is what allows for the creation of 
focused codes (Charmaz, 2006).  The resulting output of focused codes allowed the 
researcher to identify themes that encompassed the concepts identified during the initial 
coding process. 
 Once focused coding was complete, the researcher began the process of theoretical 
coding analysis. Theoretical codes highlight possible relationships between the themes 
identified during the focused coding process (Charmaz, 2006).  The resulting theoretical 
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code analysis resulted in the discovery of overarching dimensions in the data, which 
became the elements of the emergent theoretical model. 
Using GTM, the researcher presents the concepts, themes, and overarching dimensions 
that emerged from the data collection and analysis process, as shown in Figure 1. 
 





Loss of Intellectual Property or Sensitive Data 
 The researcher found that loss of intellectual property or sensitive data included 
situational awareness and blackmail.  These themes and representative data are presented 
in Appendix E. 
Situational Awareness 
 Situational awareness is defined in the seminal Endsley (1995) article as “…the 
perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the 
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future” (p. 
36).  Organizations are right to be worried about the risk associated with employees 
disclosing confidential information (Fuduric & Mandelli, 2014).  Working from the 
Endsley (1995) definition, executives need to be aware of the possibility of financial risk 
to the organization, which can result from the sharing of data (text or images) via their 
personal SNS.  As respondent #4 observed: 
“We talk about we want to share pictures and share how great and wonderful it is 
to work there, but we also want to be very aware of the surroundings when we 
take pictures, of what we post that someone might be able to see pseudocode in 
the background, or those types of things…” 
 
 As a result of these types of behaviors, organizations face a financial risk due to the 
exposure of intellectual property or sensitive data.  
Blackmail 
 (Merriam-Webster, n.d.) defines blackmail as “extortion or coercion by threats 
especially of public exposure or criminal prosecution.”  Respondents emphasized the 
financial risk that organizations face as a result of their executives being blackmailed as a 
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result of something they posted on their personal SNS.  Respondent #3 offered this 
observation regarding the financial risk to the organization associated with executive 
blackmail scenarios: 
“The business is higher profile, more prone to any sort of blackmail, ransom, 
anything like that, and my belief is that they've got to be a little bit more careful about 
what they post, how it's posted, when it's posted, and things like that.” 
 
Compliance violations 
 The researcher found that compliance violations included HIPAA and SEC concerns.  
These themes and representative data are presented in Appendix E. 
HIPAA violations 
 U.S. lawmakers created The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 (HIPAA) to protect the privacy and security of certain types of health information 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.).  The act empowers the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services Office of Civil Rights (OCR) to enforce the 
act by conducting complaint investigations as well as conducting compliance reviews 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, n.d.).  Organizations that violate 
HIPAA face potentially substantial fines (Green, 2007; Parks, Xu, Chu, & Lowry, 2017; 
Solove, 2013).  Organizations can face financial risk from executives sharing information 
on their personal SNS, which violates HIPAA.  As respondent #10 described, an 
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executive can share patient information in the act of attempting to show organizational 
competence, thus creating a HIPAA violation: 
 “Imagine an executive tweets something to the tune of ‘we're so good at what we do, 
Beyonce chose our hospital for her healthcare.’ Unless this was very clearly approved by 
Beyonce, this is a HIPAA violation at minimum.” 
 
SEC violations 
 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the federal agency charged with 
overseeing publicly traded organizations and can initiate civil action against lawbreakers, 
or can also work with the Justice Department to initiate criminal actions (U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission, n.d.).  Organizations can face financial risk from executives 
sharing information that violates securities law. 
 As respondent #10 described: 
‘[For publicly traded organizations] there’s a lot of rules around what you can say that 
is material to the business and how that is disseminated, so they've got to be very 
careful. I think that, that from a financial risk perspective, that could cause fines and 
loss of business, and potential, other legal lawsuit issues if they aren't careful about 
what and how they say things that are material to the business.’ 
 
Harm to reputation 
 The researcher found that harm to reputation included public scandal and negative 
social media incidents.  These themes and representative data are presented in Appendix 
E. 
Public scandal 
 Public scandal can cause financial risk to an organization (Drew, Kelley, & Kendrick, 
2006).  An executive can cause a public scandal when they share information on their 
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personal SNS, which draws negative attention to the executive, and by extension, the 
organization.  As respondent #5 offered: 
“We've seen it go well, and we've seen it go horrifically wrong. The guy who shot 
the rhino, right? The founder of Jimmy John's posed with big game, and it went 
on his Facebook, and it went viral, and the company damn near went bankrupt 
because people were, you know, like, ‘The guy's a horrible human being.’” 
 
 Respondent #1 offered this observation about executives having to balance the desire 
to share information against the potential financial risk it can bring to the organization: 
“I think you can do whatever you want to do; you just have to be careful and set some 
boundaries with how you're going to use that media to influence, right? So you don't 
want your personal life too much influencing the business life so-to-speak, if that 
makes any sense” 
 
Negative social media incident 
 Negative social media incidents can occur when an organization executive engages 
with a customer, employee, vendor, or the public at large via their personal SNS.  The 
organization faces financial risk from these types of interactions, even when the incident 
occurs on an executive’s personal SNS.   
 Respondent #5 described this situation, in which an executive participated in a 
negative social media incident with someone: 
“’Well, that must mean clearly, we think that's what the company says.’ I'm like, 
‘Wait a second. Time out. This is on my own time.’ And they're like, ‘Yeah, but 
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you don't get to do that.’ And so that was a harsh realization, I think, for me is that 
there is no off time.” 
 
 In another example of a negative social media incident, respondent #8 described a 
situation where an organization executive shared a negative experience involving an 
organization customer while on vacation:   
 “Person went on vacation talked about the bad experiences they had at this resort. 
Turns out, that that resort was one of their biggest clients and that resulted in some 
interesting conversations”. 
 
Fraudulent Transaction Loss 
 The researcher found that fraudulent transaction loss included C-level employee 
impersonation and vendor impersonation.  These themes and representative data are 
presented in Appendix E. 
C-Level executive impersonation 
 BEC attacks were responsible for losses of more than $1.7 billion in 2019 (Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2020).  Executives potentially expose their organizations to this 
type of attack when they share information via their personal SNS.  In this situation, the 
ability of a cybercriminal to impersonate a C-Level executive is essential, as they rely on 
the natural pressures a subordinate would feel to keep the executive happy or the fear of 
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losing their job if they do not carry out the instructions of the C-Level executive.  As 
respondent #10 described:   
“…if they know a senior executive is going to be, perhaps, out of comms for a weekend, 
maybe that's a good time to start spoofing them, because they know that the real person 
can’t be reached…” 
 
When an organization executive shares details about their travel plans via their personal 
SNS, that information can be used by a cybercriminal to make their attack feel more 
authentic.  As respondent #8 described: 
“For example if a chief marketing officer just posted ‘hey, I'm going to be in 
Bahamas next week,’ I know the location. Now, I know that that person is out of 




 Another form of BEC occurs when a cybercriminal impersonates a vendor to entice 
an accounts payable employee to pay a fraudulent invoice being presented.  One possible 
scenario was described by respondent #1: 
“Let's say the CFO's on vacation. The secretary or the office manager for the 
finance department has some bills to pay. Suddenly somebody calls up and, ‘Hey. 
This is an urgent bill. If you don't pay this bill today, by X time, we're going to 
turn the lights out, or we're going to turn your internet connection off.’ Whatever 
that scenario is, and she can't get in touch or he can't get in touch with the CFO, 
suddenly now you've got people pressured to make a decision for the benefit of 
the company without the oversight, and they were able to be socially engineered 
because somebody got that information off of a public social media site…” 
 
Summary of Results 
 The results of the data analysis conducted for this study generated an emergent 
theoretical model that is grounded in the evidence found in the data.  The emergent 
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theoretical model (Figure 2) indicates the overarching dimensions that present financial 
risks to organizations from executives’ use of their personal SNS. 
 
Figure 2.  Emergent theoretical model 
Loss of Intellectual Property or Sensitive Data 
 The analysis of information provided by respondents resulted in the discovery of this 
overarching dimension and is grounded in the discovery of two themes:  Situational 
awareness and Blackmail.  The discovery of these themes is grounded in the information 
provided by respondents during their interviews.  Respondents offered multiple 
observations of incidents in which organizations were faced with situations where their 
intellectual property or other sensitive data was exposed through information shared by 
executives’ personal SNS, this creating a financial risk to the organization.  Additionally, 
respondents were able to offer scenarios in which executives could expose intellectual 
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property or sensitive data via their personal SNS, and thus expose their organization to 
financial risk as a result. 
Compliance violations 
 The analysis of information provided by respondents resulted in the discovery of this 
overarching dimension and is grounded in the discovery of two themes:  HIPAA 
violations and SEC violations.  The discovery of these themes is grounded in the 
information provided by respondents during their interviews.  Respondents offered 
multiple instances of executives engaging in behavior on their personal SNS that resulted 
in SEC investigations, thus exposing their organizations to financial risk.  Additionally, 
respondents were able to offer various scenarios where things executives share via their 
personal SNS could result in either HIPAA or SEC violations, thus exposing their 
organizations to financial risk.  
Harm to reputation 
 The analysis of information provided by respondents resulted in the discovery of this 
overarching dimension and is grounded in the discovery of two themes:  Public scandal 
and Negative social media incident.  The discovery of these themes is grounded in the 
information provided by respondents during their interviews.  Respondents offered 
multiple instances of executives sharing information via their personal SNS, which 
resulted in either a public scandal for the organization or a negative social media incident, 
which resulted in financial risk to the organization.  Additionally, respondents were able 
to envision multiple scenarios in which something an executive shared via their personal 
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SNS could result in either a public scandal or negative social media event, which could 
potentially result in financial risk to the organization. 
Fraudulent Transaction Loss 
 The analysis of information provided by respondents resulted in the discovery of this 
overarching dimension and is grounded in the discovery of two themes:  C-Level 
employee impersonation or Vendor impersonation.  The discovery of these themes is 
grounded in the information provided by respondents during their interviews.  
Respondents were able to offer multiple instances of executives sharing information via 
their personal SNS, which resulted in adversaries being able to impersonate a C-Level 
executive, resulting in a successful BEC attack, thus exposing the organization to 
financial risk.  Respondents were also able to provide multiple instances where 
information shared by an executive via their personal SNS allowed a cybercriminal to 
impersonate a vendor that did or potentially did business with the organization.  These 
impersonations resulted in a successful BEC attack, which also exposed the organization 
to financial risk.  Furthermore, respondents were able to offer multiple scenarios wherein 
information shared by an executive on their personal SNS could lead to successful BEC 
attacks, thus potentially exposing the organization to financial risk. 
Summary 
 This chapter provided a detailed overview of the methodological framework, data 
coding, analysis, and interpretation used in this study.  Four overarching dimensions were 
identified through data analysis:  Loss of Intellectual Property or Sensitive Data; 
Compliance violations; Harm to reputation; and Fraudulent Transaction Loss.  The 
respondents’ quotes that were related to their statements in each of the four overarching 
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dimensions were also presented.  Next, this chapter discussed the findings of the study, 
showing how respondent data were grouped into themes, which ultimately led to the 
discovery of the overarching dimensions for this study.  Finally, this chapter presented 
the four overarching dimensions in an emergent theoretical model that answered the 





Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
Introduction 
 This chapter presents the conclusions reached in this study.  The research question 
will be outlined and answered, and implications for the study will be discussed.  Finally, 
this chapter concludes with recommendations for future study. 
Conclusions 
 The goal of this study was to explore what financial risks organizations face from 
executives’ use of their personal SNS.  This study addressed the research question 
proposed in this study:  What executive personal SNS behaviors pose financial risks to an 
organization?  In this study, the researcher interviewed nine information security 
professionals to uncover their perceptions and experiences in order to provide answers to 
the research question. 
 The study met its overall goal of answering the research question and generating an 
emergent theoretical model. This study utilized a grounded theory approach to collect 
qualitative data by interviewing nine information security professionals regarding their 
personal experiences, beliefs, and perceptions of financial risks that organizations face 
from executives’ use of their personal SNS.  The data analysis conducted for this study 
resulted in the discovery of overarching dimensions, themes, and concepts that addressed 
the research question for this study.  The results of this study revealed four overarching 
dimensions of executives’ behavior on their personal SNS that pose financial risks to 
organizations:  Loss of Intellectual Property or Sensitive Data; Compliance Violations; 
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Harm to Reputation; and Fraudulent Transaction Loss.  Furthermore, these overarching 
dimensions were grounded in underlying themes.  A summary of these dimensions and 
themes are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Summary of Overarching Dimensions and Themes 
Overarching Dimensions Themes 
Loss of Intellectual Property or Sensitive 
Data  
 Situational Awareness 
 Blackmail 
  
Compliance Violations  
 HIPAA violations 
 SEC violations 
  
Harm to Reputation  
 Public Scandal 
 Negative Social Media incident 
  
Fraudulent Transaction Loss  
 C-level Employee impersonation 
 Vendor impersonation 
 
The discovery of these items led to the creation of an emergent theoretical model that 
explains the financial risks that organizations face from executives’ use of their personal 
SNS and thus addressed the research question for this study.   
 This study has strengths.  One strength is the researcher’s years of industry 
experience.  This experience allowed the researcher to understand industry jargon used 
by the respondents in the interview process and allowed the researcher to easily grasp the 
significance of respondents’ statements about how a particular given example was 
important in answering the study’s research question.  Another strength of this study is 
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the use of grounded theory to explore the study’s research question.  The researcher’s use 
of grounded theory allowed him to collect ground truth from industry experts without 
relying on a theoretical lens through which to view the data, and thus avoid bias.  The 
grounding of concepts found in the reality of the data collected is key to the use of 
grounded theory, as it helps the researcher guard against internal bias (Corbin & Strauss, 
1990).  Yet another strength is the diversity of the industry verticals reflected in the 
demographic, and how closely their percentages mirror the data reported by The United 
States Census Bureau (2020b).  The generalizability of this study’s findings is increased 
as a result of this diversity and percentage of individual industry representation. 
 This study has weaknesses.  The previously mentioned researcher’s industry 
experience could be considered a weakness as it opened the possibility of researcher bias 
due to prior firsthand experiences.  To counter the potential bias, the researcher made 
every attempt to discard previously held assumptions and engage in active listening to 
respondents’ answers with an open mind.  Another weakness is the potential for elite bias 
to influence the data collection process.  The researcher countered the potential bias by 
interviewing respondents of varying statuses to capture a broader understanding of the 
phenomenon being studied.  Another weakness is not testing the emergent theoretical 
model created in this study.  While a weakness, the lack of testing of the emergent 
theoretical model is also an avenue for future research. 
 Lastly, this study has limitations.  One limitation was the access to information 
security professionals who would commit to sitting for an interview due to time 
constraints or general availability issues.  Another limitation was the researcher’s 
available time to conduct interviews and subsequent data analysis.  Yet another limitation 
54 
 
relates to the generalizability of the results.  The respondents were all located in the same 
geographical area of one major city in the southeast United States.  As a result, the results 
found in this study may not apply to other geographical regions in the United States or 
foreign countries.  Another limitation of the study relates to some of the data collected for 
the Compliance violations overarching dimension.  While the industries represented in 
the study are varied, all respondents pointed to two types of compliance violations in 
their interviews – HIPAA and SEC.  As a result, the associated themes are inferences 
based on interview data.  While regulatory violations apply to all market verticals, some 
verticals are more directly impacted by these particular regulations than others. 
Implications 
 No known published qualitative research exists that presents findings of the financial 
risks organizations face from executives’ use of their personal SNS.  These behaviors 
create financial risk for organizations because of the information executives sometimes 
share, which cybercriminals then leverage for use in attacks (Palmer, 2020; Social-
Engineer LLC, 2019).  Cybercriminals attacking organizations is not a new or novel idea.  
What is novel, and thus worthy of study, is understanding the financial risks 
organizations may face as a result of information executives share in their personal SNS. 
 This study has implications for the information security personnel tasked with 
protecting their organization from threats, as this newly discovered threat vector may 
require a change in operational procedures.  This study also has implications for 
organization risk management personnel who may not have been aware of the threats 
which come from their executives' use of their personal SNS and thus have not factored 
this newly discovered threat vector into their overall risk management process.  Finally, 
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this study also has implications for organization policy, human resources, and legal 
personnel who may not have been aware of the threat from this newly discovered vector 
and may now have to craft new management policies or employment contracts. 
Recommendations 
 This study was a grounded theory research effort designed to discover financial risks 
that organizations may face from executives’ use of their personal SNS.  Future research 
is needed to test the emergent theoretical model put forth in this study.  Future research 
should also be done to confirm the overarching dimensions and themes discovered in this 
study, possibly using a different research method such as Delphi panel or quantitative 
survey instrument.  Future research should also explore the possibility of cues being 
present that could help organizations minimize the financial risks they face when 
executives use their personal SNS.  Once such research possibility is a retrospective 
inspection of the information executives share, in order to develop guidelines for 
executives regarding what they share via their personal SNS.  Another such research 
possibility is to explore proactive steps executives can use to minimize financial risks to 
their organization when they do share information via their personal SNS.  For example, 
exploring personal circumstances such as the use of a personal device for work and 
personal matters, device exposure when personal, intimate relationships end, or 
children’s use of the executive’s personal or corporate computing assets are all areas that 
warrant future research. 
 Recommendations for information security, legal, and human resources practitioners 
include using the overarching dimensions and themes discovered in this study to conduct 
a risk assessment to determine the extent to which their organization may be at risk.  If 
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supported by risk assessment findings, organization information security personnel 
should explore processes to monitor their executives’ personal SNS channels.  If also 
supported by risk assessment findings, organizations human resources and legal 
personnel should explore the creation of new organization policies that specifically target 
executives’ use of their personal SNS.  Such policies may seek to create boundaries 
around what executives can share or may even seek to prohibit such behavior. Next, 
human resources and legal practitioners may seek to prohibit executives’ use of personal 
SNS as a term of employment by including appropriate language in employment 
contracts.  Finally, information security practitioners, in collaboration with human 
resources and legal practitioners, may seek to create a security education, training, and 
awareness (SETA) program that specifically targets executives and their use of personal 
SNS, to educate and raise overall awareness for this special group of employees with a 
specific threat vector. 
Summary 
 This study addressed the research question: what executive personal SNS behaviors 
pose financial risks to an organization.  The study was relevant due to the lack of extant 
literature on the research question being asked.  The study explored the research question 
through the use of GTM.  The researcher chose GTM because the nature of the research 
question being asked required the collection of ground truth based on the observations 
and experiences of qualified information security professionals. 
 The researcher developed a semi-structured interview question guide to answer the 
research question.  The questions were open-ended and designed to elicit thick, rich data 
for analysis.  The researcher developed the question guide and then had two subject 
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matter experts vet it in order to assess the questions and to ensure the validity and 
reliability of the data to be collected.  The researcher collected demographic data from 
respondents before conducting interviews.  The researcher interviewed all respondents 
either in-person or via meeting-at-distance software and recorded all interviews after 
obtaining permission.   
 Before commencing full data collection, the researcher conducted a pilot interview 
with a respondent to ensure the question guide would ensure the collection of the data 
needed to meet study objectives.  The researcher conducted initial coding of the 
interview, then had the coding and interview data reviewed for validity by an experienced 
academic researcher. After receiving positive feedback on the initial coding and interview 
data collected, the researcher commenced with full data collection. 
 Respondents responded to the questions asked, with the researcher having the 
flexibility to ask probing or follow-up questions as needed throughout the interview.  
Once the researcher concluded the interview, the audio recording was sent out for 
transcription.  The researcher allowed each respondent to review the transcribed file to 
ensure validity and authenticity.  The researcher commenced with the initial coding of the 
interview immediately afterward.  The researcher engaged a subject matter expert to code 
each interview as well.  The researcher provided the interviews to the subject matter 
expert in groups of two, and also provided a codebook developed by the reviewer during 
his initial coding process, to use in their coding process.  Coding conflicts occurred in 
three rounds of interview coding, which resulted in the researcher and the subject matter 
expert meeting three separate times for a total of approximately 90 minutes, in order to 
reach a consensus on all conflicts.  Once the initial coding process was completed, the 
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researcher calculated a Krippendorff’s alpha to ensure intercoder agreement.  The 
Krippendorff’s alpha score was .874, thus confirming intercoder agreement in the initial 
coding process.  The initial coding process allowed the researcher to identify basic 
concepts present in the data, and the initial codes were the output needed for the next step 
in the coding process. 
 Next, the researcher commenced focused coding of the data, using the initial codes 
identified in the previous step.  Focused coding allows the researcher to synthesize and 
understand larger chunks of data, as Charmaz (2006) explained.  By comparing data 
against data, the researcher was able to create the focused code output that was needed 
for the next step in the coding process and allowed the researcher to identify themes that 
encompassed the concepts identified in the initial coding phase. 
 The final step in the coding process was theoretical coding.  Theoretical coding 
highlights relationships between themes identified during the focused coding process 
(Charmaz, 2006).  Theoretical coding relied on the output of focused codes from the 
previous step and resulted in the identification of the overarching dimensions in the data, 
which helped form the emergent theoretical model that addressed the study’s research 
question.    































Research Question - What executive social networking site (SNS) behaviors pose 
financial risks to an organization? 
 
Introduction:   
 
My name is Andy Green, and I am a Ph.D. candidate who is studying how executives’ 
use of their personal social networking sites could pose financial risks to their 
organization, for my dissertation to finish my degree.  I appreciate you taking the time to 
talk with me so that I can get your thoughts on the area I am researching.   
 
Before we begin, I want to let you know that I will treat this interview confidentially.  I 
will take the necessary steps to anonymize your responses so that they cannot be traced 
back to you.  I will also be using a couple of voice recorders so that I can transcribe this 
interview for use in my analysis.  One device is the primary, and the other is a backup in 
case some type of problem happens with the primary.  After ensuring there was no 
recording problem with the primary, I will immediately delete the recording on the 
backup recorder. 
 
If at any point I ask a question that you’re not comfortable answering, just say so and I 
can skip it.  Also, you have the right to end this interview at any time, for any reason, no 
explanation needed. 
 
After we finish our interview, I will provide the recording to a professional transcription 
service so they can turn our interview into a text document I can use for my analysis.   
 
I will encrypt both the interview recording and the associated transcription, so as to keep 
them from being accessed by unauthorized individuals.  I will only decrypt them when I 
have to access them for work on my research. 
 




1. Let’s start with you telling me a little bit about yourself?  Your name, where you 
work, your job title, how long you’ve worked for your current organization, and 
how long you’ve worked in information security overall? 
 
2. How would you describe your day-to-day workload and responsibilities? 
 
3. What are your overall thoughts about social media in general? 
 
4. Do you use social media yourself? 
 
a. Probe - Can you share any stories about your own social media 




5. What are your overall thoughts about how employees use social media? 
 
a. Probe – Can you share any stories about situations you’ve seen or heard 
about, involving a co-worker’s use of social media that was noteworthy to 
you in some way for them, or their organization? 
 
6. What are your overall thoughts about organization executives who use social 
media in a personal capacity? 
 
a. Probe – Not just CEO “persona” – focus more on the entire C-suite, not 
just the “face” of the organization (CTO, CIO, CISO, CFO, CMO, etc.) 
 
7. Do you think organization executives’ use of social media in a personal capacity 
could pose a risk to their organization? 
 
a. Probe – Why or why not? 
b. Probe – How so? 
c. Probe – Financial risks? 
 
8. Can you share any examples of situations where you thought that an executive’s 
use of social media in a personal capacity may have exposed their organization to 
risk? 
 
a. Probe – How do you think that situation actually exposed the organization 
to financial risk? 
 
9. Do you think that executive use of social media in a personal capacity is a risk to 
your organization? 
 
a. Probe – Why or why not? 
b. Probe - How so?  
 
10. Are you concerned about organizational risks stemming from third party use of 
personal social media? 
 
a. Probe – Who are you worried about? 
b. Probe – Why do they concern you? 
 
11. Are there ways for an organization to minimize any risk exposure it may face 
from one of its executives using social media?  
 
a. Probe - What might those be? 
 
12. Are there any advantages to an organization which arise from an executive’s use 




a. Probe - What might those be? 
 
13. Thinking about your industry; What are your thoughts on the effect of personal 
SNS usage by executives on their companies value? 
 
14. If an executive were to come to you and ask, “What are some things I should or 
shouldn’t do on my social media accounts”, what guidance would you give them? 
 
a. Probe – Why? 
 
15. Is there anything else you’d like to talk about that I haven’t asked? 
 
16. Is there some question you think I should have asked, that I didn’t? 
 
















All questions are optional in nature. 
1. What is your age in years? 







h. 75 or older 
2. What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?  (If you’re 
currently enrolled in school, please indicate the highest degree you have 
received.) 
a. Less than a high school diploma 
b. High school degree or equivalent (e.g. GED) 
c. Some college, no degree 
d. Associate degree (e.g. AA, AS) 
e. Bachelor’s degree (e.g. BA, BS) 
f. Master’s degree (e.g. MA, MS, MEd) 
g. Professional degree (e.g. MD, DDS, DVM) 
h. Doctorate (e.g. PhD, EdD) 
3. Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or of Spanish origin? 
a. Yes - Hispanic 
b. Yes - Latino 
c. Yes - Spanish 
d. No 
4. How would you describe yourself (select all that apply)? 
a. White 
b. Black or African American 
c. American Indian or Alaska Native 
d. Asian 
e. Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
f. Other (Text box) 
5. What is your gender? 
a. Female 
b. Male 
c. Non-binary/third gender 
d. Prefer to self-describe (Text box) 
6. What is your total household income? 
a. Less than $60,000 
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b. $60,000 to $69,999 
c. $70,000 to $79,999 
d. $80,000 to $89,999 
e. $90,000 to $99,999 
f. $100,000 to $109,999 
g. $110,000 to $119,999 
h. $120,000 to $129,999 
i. $130,000 to $139,999 
j. $140,000 to $149,999 
k. $150,000 or greater 
7. Which of the following industries most closely matches the one in which you are 
employed? 
a. Forestry, fishing, hunting or agriculture support 
b. Real estate or rental and leasing 
c. Mining 
d. Professional, scientific or technical services 
e. Utilities 
f. Management of companies or enterprises 
g. Construction 
h. Admin, support, waste management or remediation services 
i. Manufacturing 
j. Educational services 
k. Wholesale trade 
l. Health care or social assistance 
m. Retail trade 
n. Arts, entertainment or recreation 
o. Transportation or warehousing 
p. Accommodation or food services 
q. Information 
r. Other services (except public administration) 
s. Finance or insurance 
t. Unclassified establishments 




9. How long have you worked in the information security or cyber security field? 
a. Less than 1 year 
b. 1-2 years 
c. 3-4 years 
d. 5-6 years 
e. 7-8 years 
f. 9-10 years 
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g. Longer than 10 years 
10. How long have you worked at your current employer? 
a. Less than 1 year 
b. 1-2 years 
c. 3-4 years 
d. 5-6 years 
e. 7-8 years 
f. 9-10 years 
g. Longer than 10 years 
11. How long have you worked in your current position? 
a. Less than 1 year 
b. 1-2 years 
c. 3-4 years 
d. 5-6 years 
e. 7-8 years 
f. 9-10 years 
g. Longer than 10 years 
12. What is your current job title? (Text box) 
13. Which of the following best describes your current job level? 
a. Owner/Executive/C-Level 
b. Senior management 
c. Middle management 
d. Intermediate 
e. Entry-level 
f. Other (please describe) (Text box) 
14. About how many employees work for your current organization 





15. About how much revenue does your current organization generate each year? 
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• ‘We talk about we want to share pictures 
and share how great and wonderful it is to 
work there, but we also want to be very 
aware of the surroundings when we take 
pictures, of what we post that someone 
might be able to see…’ 
  
• ‘I've seen some folks tweet some pictures 
of their network diagrams’ 
  
• ‘I’ve seen some folks… accidentally 
putting credentials up on Facebook’ 
  
• ‘And, he had their YouTube credentials on 
a sticky note, on his monitor’ 
  
• ‘…but now it happens a lot on Twitter too, 
and I've seen organizations post passwords’ 
  
• ‘[Executives]… be very aware of the 
surroundings when we take pictures, of what 
we post that someone might be able to see 
pseudocode in the background’ 
   
 
Blackmail 
• 'The business is higher profile, more prone 
to any sort of blackmail, ransom, anything 
like that, and my belief is that they've got to 
be a little bit more careful about what they 
post, how it's posted, when it's posted, and 
things like that' 
  
• ‘what happens in their private lives could 
certainly be used to gain leverage over them 
in a business capacity, so blackmailing them 
for ...’ 
  
• ‘I could easily see it as a future possibility 
that an executive could post something 
either without realizing its importance or 
accidently posting something that could be 
used as blackmail against them.’ 
  
• ‘Executive being blackmailed as a result of 
something they post is real. Jeff Bezos is a 




• ‘It’s more likely to occur when execs use a 
social media platform to privately message 
and disclose things they shouldn’t or behave 
in a manner that puts that individual in a 
compromising position either morally or 
ethically.’ 
  
• ‘Let's just say that they are very active, and 
things that are done within social media that 
are not necessarily, you know, ethical in the 
sense of like what happens in their private 
lives could certainly be used to gain leverage 
over them in a business capacity, so 
blackmailing them for ... You know, if they 
access pictures, or something along those 
lines, because the potential damage for that 
kind of information and getting it out to the 
public has its damages to the company, as 
well.’ 
   
Compliance 
Violations   
 HIPAA violations 
• ‘Imagine an executive tweets something to 
the tune of "we're so good at what we do, 
Beyonce chose our hospital for her 
healthcare". Unless this was very clearly 
approved by Beyonce, this is a HIPAA 
violation at minimum.’ 
  
• ‘One could even argue that executive's 
[sic] shouldn't even know about the 
individual patients because they aren't 
directly involved in patient care.’ 
  
• ‘The funny thing [when thinking about 
HIPAA violations] about inference is that 
you never know what seemingly innocent 
piece of information is harmful.’ 
  
• ‘Certainly, you could see a health care exec 
talking about a patient, naming a name…’ 
   
 SEC violations 
• ‘I would envision the possibility that 
executives may get overly excited about big 
“deals” or huge “issues” with customers and 
tweet or post in instagram about things that 
would violate SEC. this may fall under 
“manipulating market prices” or “insider 
trading” by sharing too much or confidential 
information with followers who in turn react 
79 
 
to this with information with  buying/selling 
stocks based on the post.’ 
  
• ‘Elon Musk is a great example of that 
where he gets himself in trouble all the time 
by talking about things that aren't the way 
the SEC wants him to release that 
information.’ 
  
• ‘[For publicly traded organizations] there’s 
a lot of rules around what you can say that is 
material to the business and how that is 
disseminated, so they've got to be very 
careful. I think that, that from a financial risk 
perspective, that could cause fines and loss 
of business, and potential, other legal lawsuit 
issues if they aren't careful about what and 
how they say things that are material to the 
business.’ 
  
• ‘Publicly traded companies have to be very 
careful because obviously C-level people, 
many of them are on the board of directors 
and they are privy to information that's not 
necessarily for public consumption, and if it 
gets out there aside from the normal 
channels where the stockholders are 
informed about these decisions, about these 
things, it could impact the stock price.’ 
   
   
   
Harm to 
Reputation   
 Public Scandal 
• ‘It has ended people's careers. Do you 
support... Who was it? The gentleman that 
was a part of Mozilla. Was there... The CEO 
at the time? Who supported... who tweeted 
that he was not in favor of some boycott 
against some company. I don't want to say it 
was Chick-fil-A. It was something like that, 
where he expressed support for some 
organization, and he was labeled a bigot, and 
all sorts of things. And he got run out of his 




• ‘We've seen it go well, and we've seen it 
go horrifically wrong. The guy who shot the 
rhino, right? The founder of Jimmy John's 
posed with big game, and it went on his 
Facebook, and it went viral, and the 
company damn near went bankrupt because 
people were, you know, like, "The guy's a 
horrible human being."’ 
  
• ‘Your personal profile is really not, right? 
You always can be tied back to the company 
that you represent, especially if the bigger 
company you work for... You know, the 
bigger, the bigger the problem.’ 
  
• ‘I think you can do whatever you want to 
do; you just have to be careful and set some 
boundaries with how you're going to use that 
media to influence, right? So you don't want 
your personal life too much influencing the 
business life so-to-speak, if that makes any 
sense’ 




• ‘"Well, that must mean clearly, we think 
that's what the company says." I'm like, 
"Wait a second. Time out. This is on my 
own time. And they're like, "Yeah, but you 
don't get to do that." And so that was a harsh 
realization, I think, for me is that there is no 
off time.’ 
  
• ‘Person went on vacation talked about the 
bad experiences they had at this resort. 
Turns out, that that resort was one of their 
biggest clients and that resulted in some 
interesting conversations.’ 
  
• ‘You had somebody talk about a bad 
experience at a hospital, turns out their 
company sells software to the hospital. And, 
they were talking about that on their 
personal Facebook account, except they 
didn't really have good privacy settings on 
that. And, some of the people that are friends 
with were actually at the hospital too so, it 
became interesting.’ 
   
Fraudulent 






• ‘…if they know a senior executive is going 
to be, perhaps, out of comms for a weekend, 
maybe that's a good time to start spoofing 
them, because they know that the real person 
can’t be reached…’ 
  
• ‘If you say, hey, I'm going to Cancun for 
the weekend, and then the bad actor starts 
emailing the CFO saying, hey, I'm stuck in 
Cancun, but I need you to transfer this 
money. That now is a more credible email 
and that doesn't help the organization defend 
itself.’ 
  
• ‘[Executives] have to be careful about 
putting too much of their personal 
information out there because it may be the 
piece of the puzzle that someone malicious 
might need to be able to penetrate the 
organization through an email not against 
them personally necessarily, but against their 
assistant or against someone that works for 
them.’ 
  
• ‘[Penetration testers] have typically 
created, very, very precise attacks that have 
penetrated the network, and that was 
because people gave too much information.’ 
  
• ‘For example if a chief marketing officer 
just posted hey, I'm going to be in Bahamas 
next week, I know the location. Now, I 
know that that person is out of office and I 
can use that information for let's say, social 
engineering…’ 





• ‘Let's say the CFO's on vacation. The 
secretary or the office manager for the 
finance department has some bills to pay. 
Suddenly somebody calls up and, "Hey. This 
is an urgent bill. If you don't pay this bill 
today, by X time, we're going to turn the 
lights out, or we're going to turn your 
internet connection off." Whatever that 
scenario is, and she can't get in touch or he 
can't get in touch with the CFO, suddenly 
now you've got people pressured to make a 
decision for the benefit of the company 
82 
 
without the oversight, and they were able to 
be socially engineered because somebody 
got that information off of a public social 
media site…’ 
  
• ‘…the company gets a random invoice 
from a person saying, "Hey, so and so said 
to go ahead and pay this." That the person 
who sends the email, and the invoice, knows 
that the executive is on a plane or 
somewhere, that they are just not reachable, 
and the company doesn't do their checks and 
balances, and pays a fraudulent invoice…’ 
  
• ‘They're finding those kind of things online 
and then … embezzling your money from 
your accounts in ways that they have 
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